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NOTE
CONTROLLED GROWTH ZONING: CONFRONTING
THE INEVITABLE
INTRODUCTION
It is evident to the residents of urban areas that the unbri-
dled and unplanned growth of the last two decades has had
numerous ramifications for all aspects of life. The rapid resi-
dential growth experienced by outlying communities in metro-
politan areas has sparked concern over the inadequacy of exist-
ing services and facilities and the future quality of life as a
burgeoning population places ever greater demands upon those
facilities.' In response to the growing awareness of the problems
of urban expansion and sprawl, communities have increasingly
focused their attention on land use regulations.2 The effects of
various land use policies on suburban and urban residents are
undergoing close examination, while experimentation with
land use management itself has come into vogue.' The past
decade has witnessed the emergence of a relatively novel form
of regulation which falls within the general rubric of controlled
' See generally TASK FORCE ON LAND UTIZATMON AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF
LAND: A CITIZENS' Poucy GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (1973) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPoRr]; Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 298 (1955); Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling
Growth, in 11 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 361 (R. Scott ed. 1975); Morrison,
Population Movements and the Shape of Urban Growth: Implications for Public Policy
(Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Research Reports, Vol.
V, 1972).
2 One commentator has aptly described the state of land use controls in most
communities:
The theory behind the current system is that the members of a community
can sit down one fine day and determine not only the general nature of its
future development but also every detail. . . . [Tihis rests on the assump-
tion that it has a clear vision of an end state for itself ....
Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregulation v.
Administrative Discretion, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADnm4IsTRATvE AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TEcHNIQUES 3, 4 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
It is of interest to note that Lexington, Kentucky, is currently seeking advice from
the author of the Ramapo plan, Robert Freilich. Lexington Herald-Leader, May 22,
1977, § D, at 1, col. 2.
3 See generally E. FINKLER & D. PETERSON, NONGROWTH PLANNING STRATEGIES
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FINKLER & PETER oN].
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growth zoning.4 Although zoning ordinances have been recog-
nized as a legitimate exercise of a state's police powers since
1926,1 and despite the fact that all zoning serves to regulate or
control competing uses of land in some fashion or another, it
has been only in the recent past that comprehensive strategies
were devised to allow local determination of the rate and qual-
ity of future expansion.'
The conflicts which are inherent in the urbanized environ-
ment affect nearly two-thirds of the U.S. population.7 Subur-
ban development has been fostered not only by low land prices
on the urban fringes, but also by federal monies expended to
aid residential construction and to provide school, sewer and
highway facilities. In many metropolitan areas we are left with
what has been termed "urban sprawl."8 In large part the ex-
pansion of the suburban residential areas has been character-
ized by flight from the city9 and commercial relocation, leaving
many city centers burdened with high tax rates. These in turn
must be borne by the economically disadvantaged, those aged,
poor, ethnic and minority group members who lack, or, less
often, choose not to exercise, the mobility to escape.'"
I Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
SFnKLER & PETERSON, supra note 3, at 7.
Between 1960 and 1970 the population included within the Census Bureau's
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) increased from 63% to 68.6%. Land
area incorporated within the SMSAs during the same decade grew from 8.7% to 11.0%
of the total land surface. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITrD STATES: 1976, 16 (97th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
STATiSTICAL ABSTRACT].
8 Urban sprawl "refers to an unfettered form of urban expansion which is charac-
terized by the initial nonuniform improvement of isolated and scattered parcels of land
located on the fringes of suburbia. . . ... Note, A Zoning Program for Phased Growth:
Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723
(1972) (footnotes omitted).
I During the 1960s the racial composition of central cities changed from 30% to
27.9% for whites and from 50.5% to 56.5% for blacks and other minorities. While the
white population in the urban fringe increased from 22.8% to 28.9% between 1960 and
1970, the minority population grew from 8.4% to 12.3%. STATIsTcAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 7, at 18.
,0 In 1974, 9.8% of the white residents of central cities and 29.6% of the black
residents fell below federal poverty levels. Of the residents outside the central cities
but still within the metropolitan areas, 6.2% of the white and 21.9% of the black were
below poverty levels. In contrast, of those who lived outside metropolitan areas, 11.7%
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Two themes which go hand-in-hand with these occur-
rences are pervasive today. The first is the right of private
exploitation of land. That this is a deeply held value is mani-
fested by individual frustration over programs sponsored by
any authority, be it municipal or state, or worse, federal, to
specify preferred land use patterns. The second theme, clearly
related to the first, is the propriety of local autonomy in land
use regulation. These two traditions often conflict not only with
one another, but also with attempts at state, regional and na-
tional planning." The fundamental rights in question involve
the relationship between individuals and their communities,
for the specification of property rights has characterized society
throughout recorded history."
The report of the Task Force on Land Use and Urban
Growth stated: "[T]he new attitude toward growth is not ex-
clusively motivated by economics. It appears to be part of a
rising emphasis on humanism, on the preservation of natural
and cultural characteristics that make for a humanly satisfying
living environment."' 3 Whatever the motivation, it is clear that
suburban towns are faced with pressures which confuse them
and spur them to consult 'vith an expanding cadre of urban
planners. 4 It is significant to all parties involved that these
future plans eventually find their way into the judicial system.
It is especially significant to the judiciary itself, which often
mediates competing interests in areas over which it has little
expertise."'
The controlled growth schemes are based on the premise
and 42.0% of the white and black populations respectively qualified for low-income
status. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT PoPULATON RE-
PORTS, MONEY INCOME AM POVMRv STATUS OF FAmmLES AND PERSONS iN THE UNITED
STATES: 1974, 23 (Advance Report 1975).
" See generally H. CHUDACOFF, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN URBAN SocTY (1975);
R. MoHL & J.F. RIcHAmSON, Tan URBAN EXPERmCE: THEMES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1973); S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969).
11 Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-in: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REV. 435
(1964).
,TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
" See cases cited note 4 supra for explanation of the motivations behind consult-
ing urban planners; Franklin, Land Use and Litigation, 32 URB. LAND 3 (May 1973).
11 "Implicit in such a philosophy of judicial self-restraint is the growing awareness
that matters of land use and development are peculiarly within the expertise of stu-
dents of city and suburban planning.. . ." Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285
N.E.2d 291, 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 151 (1972).
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that local zoning is the foundation of land use regulation. The
controls currently employed include moratoria on residential
construction and development; sewer, water or school facility
expansion; population "caps"; planned unit developments;
and timed development programs."6 Although advocates and
opponents alike are drawn from disparate camps, 17 fundamen-
tal issues are recognized by both sides, namely the legitimacy
of programs likely to result in exclusionary zoning and the con-
stitutional issues of equal protection, due process, and the free-
dom to travel, migrate and settle. 8 On the one hand, plans
which endorse deliberate, reasoned assessment of future growth
policies, in recognition of land as a limited resource rather than
a commodity, are a welcome perspective on a troubled vista.
On the other hand, and here the balance must be carefully
struck, locally-originated programs may promote the very ex-
clusivity and parochial attitudes which are partially responsi-
ble for the problems that appear virtually inescapable today.
The advocates of slow growth movements cite numerous
reasons for their involvement. They deny that they are extre-
mists, either environmental, fiscal or social. Rather, they assert
the desire to curb unplanned and undesirable development, to
enhance the "quality of life" in the community, to reestablish
fiscal stability for local governments, and in general to reduce
the demands upon scarce resources in order to contribute to a
healthier environment, socially, psychologically and physi-
', R. BABCOCK & F. BossELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND
HOUSING IN THE 1970s (1973) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN].
'7 For arguments supporting controlled growth zoning see Fagin, supra note 1, at
300-303; Freilich, supra note 1, at 149-50; Note, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophy-
lactic Law for Planners, 57 CoRNELL, L. RPv. 827, 837-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Time Controls]. Opposing arguments are presented in H. FRANKLIN, CONTROL-
LING URBAN GROwTH-BUT FOR WHOM? (Potomac Institute, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
CONTROLLING URBAN GROwTH]; Alonso, Urban Zero Population Growth, 102 DAEDALUs
191 (Fall 1973); Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1973).
11 See, e.g., BABCOCK & BossELMAN, supra note 16, at 31-38; E. BERGMAN, ELIMINAT-
ING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: RECONCILING WORKPLACE AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AREAS
(1974); Comment, The Right to Travel and its Application to Restrictive Housing
Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Restrictive Housing Laws];
Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use
Regulations? 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Another Constitu-
tional Standard].
[Vol. 66
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cally.11 Developers, on the other hand, mount equally impres-
sive arguments, ranging from the cost-benefit analyses that
reveal the opportunities for increased revenue, employment,
and commercial investment, to appeals for citizen initiative in
supporting and shaping the inevitable growth. 20 The effects of
land development can be seen in five major areas: local econ-
omy, natural environment, aesthetic and cultural values, pub-
lic and private services, and housing and social conditions."
Urban growth reflects such factors as the regional eco-
nomic situation, job market, industrial demography, and
transportation facilities.22 While the interaction of these factors
is most often speculative, the courts assessing plans are often
forced to rely on a market-based evaluation of the demand for
housing and the relative availability of it.2 Some courts have
appealed for a regional perspective in land use planning to
circumvent- the parochial views adopted by the communities
facing the bench.
24
The proponents of local economic growth by attracting
new industrial and commercial investments cite the positive
influence of an expanded economy and labor base, and the
eventual variety of professional work that will encourage a
broadening and lengthening of the occupational ladder. The
" For a discussion of the rationale offered to support slow growth schemes, see
Fagin, supra note 1, at 303-04; Freilich, supra note 1, at 149-50.
1 McKean, Growth vs. No Growth: An Evaluation, 102 DAEDALus 207 (Fall 1973);
Misuraca, Petaluma vs. The T.J. Hooper: Must the Suburbs be Seaworthy? in Il
MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 187, 189-92 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
21 P. ScHAENmAN & T. MULLER, MEASURING THE IMPACTS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
(1974).
22 A. DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS, ch. 3 (1973); Kain, The Journey-to-Work
as a Determinant of Residential Location, in HOusING URBAN AMERICA 211 (J. Pynoos,
R. Schafer & C.W. Hartman eds. 1973).
" Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975);
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970);
Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 116 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1962); Oakwood at Madi-
son, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 283 A.2d 353 (N.J. 1971); Golden v. Planning Bd.
of Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,
268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970); National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).
24 The most compelling plea was uttered by the New Jersey court in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 732, 733 n.22
(N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See also Park View Heights Corp. v. City
of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1216 n.10 (8th Cir. 1972); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395,
399 n.4 (Pa. 1970).
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natural concomitant, of course, is an increased demand for
housing. This can usually be met for those on the higher end
of the pay scale through .the construction of new single-family
homes. It is the lower income groups who suffer, however, as
"used" housing is .not in plentiful supply in a tight housing
market, and most developers have shied away from providing
low-income multi-family residences. 5 Further, goals such as
racial integration within a community are often suppressed in
favor of the construction of low-income housing.
Those -who benefit most from slowed growth programs are
the present property owners and business proprietors who
stand in line for the capital gains that come with rising prop-
erty prices. If a site is desirable to others for future expansion,
the likely effect of a no-growth or slow-growth policy is to raise
both land and housing prices.21 In addition, most programs
serve to keep new residents out, favoring the current ones, even
though the tax base may not be broadened. The exclusionary
effects, whether intended or latent, are a major concern of all
who consider any limitation on community growth. Whereas
the problems of current land use systems transcend individual
communities, the solutions have not. The inherent difficulties
in any attempt to obtain endorsement by local jurisdictions for
regional efforts arise due to traditional self-help orientations,
program funding via local property taxes, and citizen demands
that the local government be responsive to individualized in-
terests. This local solution is unlikely to be modified though the
problems of solely local solutions remain undiminished.Y
In view of the critical importance of land use controls, the
text to follow will examine the historical foundations and ra-
tionale behind controlled growth zoning schemes. Considera-
tion will be given to the more novel plans which have been
proposed. Because of their inevitable exclusionary effects, the
probable outcome of legal challenges will be examined in light
2 See generally Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The Second
Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 88 (1974); Davidoff & Davi-
doff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 509 (1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. RPv. 767 (1969).
Thompson, Problems That Sprout in the Shddow of No-Growth, in I MANAGE-
MET & CONTROL OF GROWTH 398, 403 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
See generally BABCOCK & BOSSELmAN, supra note 16, at 135-46.
[Vol. 66
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of the trends currently observable. Both those who promulgate
and those who challenge restrictive ordinances are confronted
by the insecurity once articulated by Justice Douglas: "As is
true in most zoning cases, the precise impact on value may, at
the threshold of litigation over validity, not yet be known. 12 8
I. GENERAL LAND USE PLANNING
A. Historical Backdrop
The use of zoning devices to control permissible land uses
has been observed in the United States for two centuries."
Prior to 1916, however, these attempts were both limited in
scope and sporadic in application. Absent legislative enact-
ments, competing land uses were controlled through the appli-
cation of the common law of nuisance. Nuisance law was
grounded on the premise that certain land uses are "incom-
patible with others and that the rights of all landowners will
be diminished unless the rights of all are subject to reason-
able restraints."3 This doctrine has become the principle
underlying comprehensive zoning schemes as well.
Several factors contributed to the decline of nuisance law
as a viable land use control. First, the law was designed for
individual conflicts, resolvable through the traditional case-by-
case approach. Nuisance doctrine compelled the plaintiff to
establish both that the use complained of was unreasonable
and that it resulted in substantial harm to his property and
thus reduced the property's value. Unless the plaintiff could
prove actual physical injury to property, he was generally un-
able to sustain the burden of proving a decline in the value of
his property.' Second, nuisance laws were designed to be
restorative; they were of little help to landowners or municipal-
ities which desired to anticipate the future and proscribe cer-
tain land uses. Restrictive covenants, the contractual limita-
tion of certain land uses, and easements were more effective for
private property owners. 32
I Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 10 (1974).
21 D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEvELoPMENT CONTROL LAw 69 (1971).
31 1 R.ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.03 (1968).
31 See generally ANDERSON, supra note 30, at § 7.14.
32 See generally HAGMAN, supra note 29, at §§ 165-69.
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In part as a response to the inadequacies of individual
controls, commentators advocated comprehensive zoning plans
designed to introduce a preventive orientation to the regulation
of competing land uses.3 Once municipalities exercised their
police power prerogatives, public management of private prop-
erty was destined to become a way of life for urban America.
The proper use of the police power allows local governments to
legislate for the public health, safety and welfare 34 and to es-
cape the reach of the taking provision of the fifth amendment.3 1
Each landowner is forced to bear the cost of the land use limita-
tions deemed socially desirable.3 6
Still, the power of individuals to develop land exceeded the
land use controls until the promulgation of a plan that was in
reality comprehensive.37 New York City enacted the first, full-
fledged zoning program in 1916 to address the problem con-
fronting the city; the problem, as seen by the urban planners,
was that "continued unplanned growth cannot take place with-
U ANDFmSON, supra note 30, at §§ 2.03-.09 and HAGMAN, supra note 29, at §§ 28-
52, both advocate comprehensive zoning.
1 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting
an existing brick factory from operating in a developing residential area held valid);
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (ordinance excluding stables from a
commercial district held valid); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (state statute
specifying building height limitations held valid); L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587
(1900) (ordinance designating certain areas of city for prostitution held valid); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (ordinance prohibiting laundries from operating
in wooden buildings held invalid); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) and Soon
Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885) (both upholding ordinances restricting the hours
of laundries).
15 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. A taking is held to have occurred when private property
is subjected to land use regulations which are so arbitrary and unreasonable that the
property is being used for public purposes without compensating the private owner. A
full history of this issue is presented in F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLES, & J. BArA, THE
TAINO IssuE: A SrUDy OF THE CONSTrruTIONAL LIMITS OF Gov RaIENrAL AUTmoarrY TO
REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OwNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE
OwNERs (1973).
1 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915).
3 New York City's comprehensive zoning ordinance of 1916 was adopted partly
in response to the growing concentration of skyscrapers in downtown Manhattan. By
1913 more than 50 buildings were above 20 stories and 9 were above 30. J. DELAFONS,
LAND-UsE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (Joint Center for Urban Studies 1962).
This zoning ordinance was upheld in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128
N.E. 269 (1920).
CONTROLLED GROWTH ZONING
out inviting social and economic disaster."" Yet in fact, as was
soon demonstrated, zoning preserved the status quo.39 Zoning
plans conformed themselves to existing uses; while specifying
uses for undeveloped areas in general, they failed to guide the
urban growth process. Though this result may seem undesira-
ble to those who wish to take an active hand in managing
future growth, it accurately reflects the traditional emphasis
placed on the preservation of property values"
Since the police powers belong to the state, local govern-
ments could regulate land uses through zoning only if the state
had either enacted enabling legislation or conveyed a specific
grant of power." By 1930, thirty-five states had enacted some
form of enabling statute, often modeled after the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926, and today all states have
such legislation.4 2 As a general rule legislative pronouncements
are presumed valid and constitutional.4 3 Communities which
have regulated land use pursuant to their state-granted powers
have discovered that their zoning ordinances, unless arbitrary
or unreasonable, are granted a presumption of validity by a
judiciary reluctant to scrutinize legislative acts."
21 NEW YORK COMMISSION ON BUILDING DISTRICTS AND RESTRICTIONS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT, at 6 (1916), quoted in S. TOLL, supra note 11, at 184.
31' S. TOLL, supra note 11, at 179.
0 This emphasis on the preservation of property values was recently discussed in
the committee report issued on the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of
1973:
[F]or the most part the larger public interest was and is interpreted to be
protection of property values and the economic value of land. The depend-
ency of most cities on property taxes, which in turn are dependent on prop-
erty values, serves to reinforce this prevailing purpose of land use controls.
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, LAND USE POLCY AND PLANNING Assis-
TANCE ACT, S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1973) (footnote omitted).
1 In 1926 the U.S. Department of Commerce promulgated the model Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act which granted the power to restrict population density to
prevent overcrowding and to ensure the provision of adequate municipal services to
the legislative branch of local governments. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926).
1 See HAGMAN, supra note 29, at § 21.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
" Id. The Court sanctioned several zoning devices still utilized, including spatial
districting of a community, exclusion of industrial and commercial uses from residen-
tial areas, and even segregation of residential districts by density, i.e., single-family
versus multiple-family dwellings. Before the zoning ordinance will be declared uncon-
stitutional, its provisions must be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
1977]
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The fundamental interest to be protected is the general
welfare of the public. Inherent in this notion are questions con-
cerning the level at which "public" is defined and what values
are encompassed within "welfare." These issues continue to
plague the courts. The definitions of general welfare and legiti-
mate state objectives have broadened considerably since the
Supreme Court's affirmance of comprehensive zoning in
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.45 The permissible regula-
tion of potential land use through zoning has expanded to en-
compass the preservation of historical,48 aesthetic,47 and spe-
cific life style characteristics." These precedents and the in-
tense interest in zoning plans exhibited by suburban communi-
ties have paved the way for the logical extension of controlled
growth zoning schemes.49
Furthermore, if the zoning classification is "debatable," then "the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control." Id. at 388.
" Id. at 365.
" City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964); cf. Hankins
v. Borough of Rockleigh, 150 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1959) (rejecting historical preservation as
a proper goal of zoning).
47 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Justice Douglas penned the following oft-
quoted statement:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled ....
Id. at 32-33.
11 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Justice Douglas again deliv-
ered the majority opinion in which he stated, in what may become very persuasive
dicta, that the general welfare was broad enough to encompass the following:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs
.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones .where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9.
See also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 45 U.S.L.W. 3343 (1976), on which the
Supreme Court is due to render judgment in the next few months. In Moore the
plaintiff grandmother is appealing application of a zoning ordinance that denies family
status to her, her son and grandson and would compel her son to live in a house other
than his mother's. The petitioners in Belle Terre were unrelated students who did not
fit the definition of family under the village's zoning ordinance. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
4' CONTROLLING URBAN GRowTH, supra note 17; Freilich, supra note 1, at 147-51;
Note, Time Controls, supra note 17, at 845-49; Another Constitutional Standard, supra
note 18, at 633-37.
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B. Controlled Growth Zoning
Zoning has undergone radical change during the past de-
cade. The next few pages will focus on the numerous attempts
at systematically controlling the rate of urban growth. A
scheme for controlled growth is one which is "intended compre-
hensively to phase the pace, guide the direction, and limit the
volume of development throughout a locality."" °
Proponents of controlled growth argue that such planning
is necessary to overcome the drawbacks inherent in traditional
Euclidian, or spatial, zoning schemes.51 Regulations which do
not concentrate exclusively on the spatial organization of com-
munities, but which are designed to operate in a temporal di-
mension as well, can offer more effective and efficient guide-
lines to rational community development. 52 Cities and towns
will thus be able to gauge their growth in reference to the avail-
ability of municipal services, such as water, waste disposal,
schools and roads. Urban sprawl can be prevented, at least
partially, by restrictions imposed primarily on residential con-
struction.
Criticism of controlled growth planning centers on the ex-
clusionary effects foreseen as inevitable. Just as previous zon-
ing devices, ranging from minimum lot size53 and floor area
requirements54 to cost ratios and multi-family restrictions,55
have often resulted in the exclusion of certain racial or income
groups,56 the ability of a community to restrict the extent of
Franklin, Legal Dimensions to Controlling Urban Growth, in II MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWTH 216, 218 (R. Scott ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Franklin]. See
also Fagin, supra note 1, at 298-99; Freilich, supra note 1, at 162.
11 Fagin, supra note 1, at 298-99; Freilich, supra note 1, at 153-57.
'2 Fagin, supra note 1, at 298-99.
u E.g., Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 93 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1952); Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1958).
" E.g., Dundee Realty Co. v. Omaha, 13 N.W.2d 634 (Neb. 1944); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 89 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S.
919 (1953).
E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Valley View
Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works,
234 P. 381, (Cal. 1925). See also Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the
Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1040 (1963).
" Sager, supra note 25, at 767; Strong, Girsh and Kit-Mar: An Unlikely Route to
Equal Opportunity in Housing, 22 ZONING DIGEST 100a (1970); Williams & Norman,
Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE
L. RIv. 475 (1971); Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 465 (1971).
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new construction is predicted to have a similar, if not more
burdensome, effect.5" Opponents of controlled growth schemes
envision zoned enclaves attempting to foist the responsibilities
of absorbing urban expansion on neighboring communities.
They maintain that controlled growth plans serve, in reality,
to protect the property interests of a limited segment of the
population under the rubric of the general welfare. 8
1. The Building Moratorium
A community caught in the throes of rapid expansion may
decide to declare a moratorium on the approval of building
permits, rezoning requests, or water and sewer connections.
Such measures, if of limited duration, would probably survive
legal challenge, given the precedent of interim zoning schemes
which allow reassessment of the local comprehensive plan.59
Furthermore, while such moratoria evidence the inadequacy of
past municipal planning and zoning decisions, they will likely
be held valid if imposed in good faith for a reasonable length
of time. There is potential for abuse of this device by local
communities, however; courts deciding these cases will be con-
fronted with the dilemma of whether to revoke the presump-
tion of validity in the face of a town's alleged improper mo-
tives." In the final analysis, the projected duration of the mea-
sure should be controlling, though this may be difficult to es-
tablish.' The latent consequences of imposing moratoria in-
clude declining construction activity, economic ruin for small
builders, less development of low-income housing, and in-
creased growth for communities which have no similar con-
trols .
62
" CONTROLLNG URBAN GROWTH, supra note 17; Alonso, supra note 17; Bosselman,
supra note 17, at 245-50; Sager, supra note 25, at 768-69.
11 Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 25, at 522; Williams & Norman, supra note 56,
at 475-77.
31 Franklin, supra note 50, at 218-19.
60 Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). The
court upheld the town's rezoning of plaintiff's land for o minimum 6 acre lot per
dwelling unit even though it had "serious worries whether the basic motivation of the
town meeting was not simply to keep outsiders. . . out of the town. . . .Were we to
adjudicate this as a restriction for all time . . . we might well come to a different
conclusion." Id. at 962.
" Freilich, supra note 1, at 364.
,2 Rivkin, Growth Control via Sewer Moratoria, 32 URBAN LAND 10, 15 (March
1974).
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2. Building Caps
One of the more direct attempts at controlling urban
growth involves the imposition of a fixed quantity of building
permits 3 or other limits upon the future construction of resi-
dential units.64 Such policies serve effectively to curb future
residential expansion. The Petaluma Plan provides an example
of the rationale behind and the operation of a scheme utilizing
building caps.65
During the 1960's the community character of Petaluma,
California, changed from a quiet agricultural center of 14,000
to a commuter suburb of San Francisco. The 1970 population
was 24,870, a seventy-seven percent increase over the 1960 fig-
ure."6 In response to this rapid growth and because of the com-
munity's desire to preserve its quality of life, a local citizens'
committee, guided by professional planning consultants, es-
tablished an official development policy named the Petaluma
Plan. Moratoria in rezoning and annexation of land were im-
posed until the community sentiment could be ascertained.
After 9 months of study, an advisory measure was placed on the
June 1973 ballot to elicit citizen reaction to a proposed limita-
tion of 500 residential units per year. Eighty percent of the
responding voters approved the plan. Coupled with the numer-
ical restriction on new residential construction for 1973-1977
was the creation of an "urban extension line," a hypothetical
boundary intended to mark the outer limits of the city's expan-
sion for the next 15 years. Furthermore, the city contracted for
municipal services on the basis of its limited development
plan. Any proposed construction in excess of four units was to
11 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 934 (1976).
" Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, 59 F.R.D. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1973). In 1971,
residents of Boca Raton voted to place a maximum limit on dwelling units in the city
at 40,000. Boca Raton, Fla., Ordinance 1733, § 1 (Oct. 3, 1972). The federal court
declined to exercise jurisdiction in favor of the state courts' determination of the
legality of the zoning ordinance.
See generally Gruen, The Economics of Petaluma: Unconstitutional Regional
Socio-Economic Impacts, in II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 173 (R. Scott ed.
1975); Misuraca, Petaluma vs. The T.J. Hooper: Must the Suburbs be Seaworthy?, in
II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 187 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
" Einsweiler, Gleeson, Ball, Morris, & Sprague, Comparative Descriptions of Se-
lected Municipal Growth Guidance Systems, in II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH
283, 321 (R. Scott ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Descriptions].
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be evaluated on a sliding point scale which took into considera-
tion both proximity to public facilities and the quality of design
and contribution to community welfare. The plan also required
that between eight and twelve percent of the building permits
issued be allocated to lower income housing.
7
The Petaluma Plan was challenged in federal district court
by local land owners and the Sonoma County Construction
Industry Association." Plaintiffs prevailed, according to Judge
Burke, because the plan imposed an impermissible burden on
the right to travel.69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the decision" on the basis of the lack of standing of the
Association and appellee landowners to assert the claims of
third parties.71 Nevertheless, taking note of the district court's
exclusive reliance on the issue of the right to travel, the court
proceeded to address and dismiss appellees' claims that the
plan was solely an exclusionary zoning regulation, was arbi-
trary and unreasonable, and hence violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and was an unreasonable
restriction on interstate commerce.
7 2
3. Sequential Timing Controls
Most traditional zoning devices control population density
either directly or indirectly by regulating lot size, floor space
requirements, the number of multi-family units, or using other
spatial criteria.73 By the addition of a time control concept, a
community theoretically may coordinate both the pace and
,1 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 574-80 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
, Id. at 574.
, Id. at 583. See also text accompanying notes 129-51 infra for a discussion of the
right to travel as a basis for challenging controlled growth plans.
71 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
11 522 F.2d at 905. See also text accompanying notes 83-121 infra for a considera-
tion of the standing issue.
72 522 F.2d at 908-10.
73 See, e.g., Williams & Norman, supra note 56, at 481-84. The major zoning
techniques that result in some form of exclusion are minimum building size require-
ments, restrictions on the number of bedrooms, prohibition of multiple-family dwelling
units, frontage and lot-width specifications, lot size requirements and the exclusion of
mobile homes.
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sequence of its development.74 Thus, designated areas are fully
and efficiently developed before undeveloped, though perhaps
proximate, land is released for community expansion. The
town of Ramapo, New York, was a pioneer in the attempt to
pattern temporally as well as spatially the residential growth.75
During the mid-1960's Ramapo residents sought a way to
control the rapid suburban expansion caused by the influx of
New York city workers. Population increased 120% between
1960 and 1970, school taxes rose rapidly and residential sprawl
became noticeable.7 In response the town amended its zoning
ordinance to create a new residential development use permit.
Approval of these special permits was conditioned on the pres-
ence of municipal facilities and services, for which Ramapo
proposed an 18-year capital improvements funding plan. This
plan scheduled sewage, drainage, road, recreation and park
facilities in stages throughout the town. Residential develop-
ment permits were granted if the site scored a certain number
of points on a development scale established by the ordinance,
covering the above services and the availability of school and
fire facilities. Developers whose sites did not meet the mini-
mum development points were allowed to install the necessary
facilities at the landowners' expense in order to obtain the
requisite building permits.77
The Ramapo plan has been tested in the courts. 78 Plaintiff
landowners, builders' association and development corporation
argued that the plan was beyond the scope of the state enabling
legislation, that it resulted in a taking under the fifth amend-
ment, and that it was exclusionary. The New York Court of
Appeals upheld the town's program, approving the attempt to
pace growth and development and hence maximize orderly
population expansion.7 ' In rejecting the taking argument, the
71 Note, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Law for Planners, 57 CORNELL
L. Rsv. 827 (1972).
71 See generally CONTROLLING URBAN GRowTH, supra note 17; Bosselman, supra
note 17, at 238-42.
71 Comparative Descriptions, supra note 66, at 304.
"Id. at 305.
71 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
" Id. The court declared:
The answer which Ramapo has posed. . . is, however, a first practical step
toward controlled growth achieved without forsaking broader social purposes
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court observed that it was relying "upon the presently permis-
sible inference that within a reasonable time the subject prop-
erty will be put to the desired use at an appreciated value.""0
II. ISSUES IN EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION
It is apparent that the legal challenges to exclusionary
zoning plans can take a number of approaches. Those who
argue against exclusionary zoning point to its pernicious ef-
fects. One major allegation is that exclusionary zoning denies
low-income and minority group Americans the same access to
housing and social resources as that enjoyed by more affluent
Americans.8' The effects of restricting low-income or minority
persons to urban centers can be seen in the inferior job oppor-
tunities, education, and social services available to inner city
residents.12 Whatever the zoning devices utilized, the legal at-
tacks have been mounted primarily on constitutional grounds
coupled where available with statutory challenges. Two issues
are of concern here: defining the constitutional tests for stand-
ing to sue and identifying viable arguments against the zoning
scheme or utilization.
.... [Flar from being exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek,
by the implementation of sequential development and timed growth, to pro-
vide a balanced cohesive community dedicated to the efficient utilization of
land.
Id. at 301, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150, 152.
Id. at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
11 Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, 1665
(1971); cf. B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 13-21 (1972) (all zoning is exclusion-
ary and development without zoning ordinances is at least as viable a technique).
For general consideration of the effects of segregation in the public schools, for
example, see J. CoLEMAN Er AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare 1966); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION
IN THE PUBLC SCHOOLS (1967); Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspira-
tions, Self-Concepts and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 300
(1975).
In addition there are disproportionately high numbers of black and minority
Americans in the lowest income levels, supra note 10. Finally, the number of jobs
available in the suburbs increased over the last decade from 7 to 10 million, while those
in central cities declined from 12 to 11 million. In addition the number of commuters
who leave center cities for work in suburban areas each day grew by 72.7% to reach
1.46 million in 1970. Lauber, Recent Cases in Exclusionary Zoning, in I MANAGEMENT
& CONTROL OF GaowTH 465, 465-66 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
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A. Standing to Sue
The first major threshold confronting parties who wish to
challenge the validity of an exclusionary zoning scheme is
whether the plaintiff has standing to sue.8 In accord with the
traditional mandate against rendering advisory opinions and
the deeply ingrained custom of offering relief only to those
actually injured,' courts have generally held that a plaintiff
must have a personal stake in the dispute, 5 usually requiring
that he or she own property affected by the zoning ordinance.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed a restrictive view of
standing in Warth v. Seldin.6 In that case the Court held that
the standing requirement was satisfied only by persons who
owned land or who had actually planned to build within the
community in question."
Challenges to zoning ordinances are usually brought in
state courts, for few plaintiffs are able to allege any substantive
federal question.n Of late, some plaintiffs have sought recourse
in federal courts where specific statutes waive the $10,000 juris-
dictional amount. 9 Plaintiffs can, for example, bring suit
against the city officials responsible for the zoning scheme,
alleging violation of their civil rights and their fourteenth
amendment rights." Absent this route, unless the disputed ac-
A ANDERSON, supra note 30, at § 21.05. A good review is provided by Note,
Alternatives to "Warth v. Seldin": The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusion-
ary Zoning Scheme, 11 URB. L. ANN. 223 (1976).
m Reasons behind construing the Article M, § 2 grant of judicial power to "cases"
or "controversies" are ably spelled out in BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH (1962)
and Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Hmv. L. Rxv. 1002 (1924).
' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
" 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
The Court asked that "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged prac-
tices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts'
intervention." Id. at 506.
91 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1970) grants original jurisdiction to courts over civil actions
in which the matter in controversy arises under federal law and exceeds $10,000. See
also ANDERSON, supra note 30, at § 2.01.
" E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(1970) allows a plaintiff in civil rights litigation to raise
his complaint in district court whether or not he satisfies the $10,000 requirement.
" Courts assume jurisdiction over the city, represented by some official who satis-
fies the "person" language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555
(1977); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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tion was undertaken by a federal agency,9' the plaintiff must
maintain the action in state court.
The critical standing question concerns those plaintiffs
who are potential residents or developers, that is, persons who
have been effectively excluded from the community by the
zoning regulations. In state court a plaintiff has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance only if he
or she is "personally aggrieved" by the operation of the regula-
tion.2 The same standard is generally used for petitioners who
seek review before zoning boards of appeals9 3 or petitioners who
seek judicial review of administrative proceedings. 4 Most state
courts interpret the standard in such a way as to compel the
plaintiff to allege a specific personal stake that was adversely
affected by the challenged ordinance. 5 This means that a
plaintiff must either allege that he has a legal or equitable
interest in the property or that a specific petition or application
was adversely affected by the zoning regulation. For the most
part, non-residents or developers without specific building
plans lack standing under this formulation."
Several state courts have expanded the standard for stand-
ing to include non-residents who own land in close proximity
or adjacent to the area under dispute. While a few states have
" E.g., a potential resident could challenge the development of a public housing
project sponsored by a federal agency. See Evans v. Hills, IV EQUAL OPPoRTuNrry IN
HousiNG (P.H.) 13,669 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'g Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (1976),
in which minority status plaintiffs challenged federal funding (by HUD) of a sewer
project in a New York community with zoning laws that prevented development of low-
income housing. The Second Circuit held that the potential residents did not satisfy
the injury in fact portion of the standing test. Id. at 14,334.
12 ANDERSON, supra note 30, at §§ 16.02, 16.03, 16.05, 16.11.
, The local board of appeals has, at the very least, original jurisdiction over
applications for special permits, exceptions, or variances in the comprehensive zoning
plan for the community. 2 A. RAmiKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 4C-1
(1972).
" Often the next step for persons dissatisfied with the outcome of their petition
before the board of appeals is review by a state court, which may not differentiate the
standards necessary to challenge an administrative decision from those requisite for
raising constitutional issues. ANDERSON, supra note 30, at §§ 16.11, 21.02. A different
point of view is presented in Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents: A Response
to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. Rav. 341 (1971).
"1 For a discussion of standing in zoning cases, see Note, Standing to Appeal
Zoning Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MicH. L. Ray. 1070,
1072 (1966); Note, supra note 83, at 226.
38 Note, supra note 83, at 226.
" See Foran v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 260 A.2d 609 (Conn. 1969); Pattison v.
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adopted new legislation,"5 a "growing minority" of states are
following the "trend toward liberalization" of the construction
of "persons aggrieved." 9
The standing question in federal court rests on similar
considerations. The plaintiff must present a case or contro-
versy'O resolvable in an adversary proceeding.'"' The courts will
decline to review cases involving political questions 02 or to ren-
der advisory opinions. 103 In 1970 the Supreme Court articulated
a two-pronged test for standing in Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.0 4 First, the plaintiff
must allege that the disputed action caused him "injury in
fact"; and second, the interest he seeks to protect must fall
within the "zone of interests" regulated by the constitutional
or statutory provision invoked. 05 Although the Data Processing
case interpreted the standing question as it related to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,"6 the test has been applied in a
number of exclusionary zoning cases. 07
The first requirement of the federal test, "injury in fact,"
serves to satisfy the requirements of a case or controversy-a
personal stake in the outcome for the plaintiff and the presen-
Corby, 172 A.2d 490 (Md. 1961); Allen v. Coffell, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1972); Borough
of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954).
i The New Jersey legislature has taken a liberal view of standing:
[A]ny person, whether residing within or without the municipality whose
right to use, acquire, or enjoy pioperty is or may be affected by an action
under the act. . . may bring suit under the New Jersey zoning provisions.
N.J. STAT. AN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). See also Aloi & Goldberg,
Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?, 1971 UaB. L.
ANN. 9, 54-58, which describes the attempts by the Massachusetts and New York
legislatures to take heed of the housing needs of potential residents within a region.
1 Note, supra note 83, at 227.
s For the traditional construction of judicial power, see note 84 supra.
'0 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
"u Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
'" Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-53 (1970).
1- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) (amended 1976).
'07 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct.
555 (1977) (citing the Court's discussion of standing in Warth v. Seldin); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Park View Heights Corp. v. City
of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
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tation of issues that are of "concrete adverseness."'' 8 This does
not mean that the injury must be of a specific type; ' in fact
the Court has been willing to recognize and protect racial, eco-
nomic, environmental, and aesthetic interests."' What is nec-
essary, however, is that the plaintiff himself be specifically
harmed and that the injury, regardless of its magnitude, be real
and not hypothetical."' Thus, a plaintiff contesting an exclu-
sionary zoning regulation must demonstrate some property in-
terest in order to meet the injury in fact requirement.12 This is
consistent with the state courts' position discussed above.1
3
The second requirement of the standing test, that the
plaintiff's interest fall within the "zone of interests" which are
protected, generally calls for an analysis of the source of the
claim asserted. The interests involved, whether economic, aes-
thetic, conservational or recreational,"' must fall within the
penumbras cast by constitutional or statutory rights."'5 The
controlling question is: Does the plaintiff have a right to judi-
cial relief, either from constitutional guarantees or statutory
provisions?" 6
In deciding standing questions the Supreme Court has fo-
cused on the injury in fact portion of the test."17 In Warth the
Court held that a non-resident plaintiff meets this requirement
for standing if he establishes a causal relationship between the
IO Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). This standard embodies the constitu-
tional limitations on jurisdiction in federal courts and directly addresses
"justiciability," i.e., whether the plaintiff has a controversy within the framework of
Article m.
'" Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact, 22 CAsE W. REs.
L. Rav. 256, 260 (1971).
,,0 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 689 n.14 (1973). In this case an environmental group challenging an Interstate
Commerce Commission freight rate increase on the basis of economic, recreational and
aesthetic harm was granted standing by a Court which stated: "We have allowed
important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake. . . than a
fraction of a vote .... Id.
M O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
112 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
"I See text accompanying notes 92-99 supra. See also Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 645, 663 (1973).
'" Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
56 (1970).
I" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
11 Id.
17 Id. at 507-08.
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zoning practices and the plaintiff's involvement with a particu-
lar project site." 8 That this is contrary to previous interpreta-
tions of the injury requirement by other courts has not deterred
the Court at all."9 The Court distinguished the other cases,
declaring that plaintiffs had "challenged zoning restrictions as
applied to particular projects that would supply housing within
their means, and of which they were intended residents." 2 ' The
Court has chosen to rely upon the presence of a specific project
site as the initial threshold for determining injury in fact; un-
less potential residents and developers are involved with a par-
ticular site, they will be denied standing to sue. Despite the
Warth facts, which limit its holding to non-residents who chal-
lenge exclusionary zoning in federal courts, state courts, if they
are so inclined, may follow the initiative taken by the Supreme
Court in limiting standing.2 '
B. Traditional Challenges to the Validity of Zoning
Ordinances
Litigants seeking to test the validity of local zoning ordi-
nances first look to the specific state enabling statute which
delegates the authority to regulate land use to communities.
Absent a showing that the ordinance in question exceeds the
authority delegated, plaintiffs then turn to constitutional prin-
ciples to attack the legislation. Several arguments are com-
monly utilized against local regulations. First, the ordinance
may violate the constitutional requirement of due process if it
is arbitrary or unreasonable or deprives a property owner of his
land without "just compensation."' Thus the owner will allege
"I Id. at 508 n.18. The need for an existing plan covering a building site satisfies
the injury test, for without that, the Court will decline to review the case on the merits.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
"' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 n.17 (1975).
" Id. at 507.
2 Hyson, The Problem of Relief in Developer-Initiated Exclusionary Zoning
Litigation, 12 Uaa. L. ANN. 21, 23 (1976).
in U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Supreme Court has
interpreted this amendment to require just compensation for any "public taking" of
private property. No compensation is required, however, if the public regulation of
property is intended to secure the public health, safety, morals or welfare. See
generally Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAav. L. Rv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings,
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that the regulation does not promote a reasonable public goal
and that it arbitrarily denies him the reasonable use of his
property.'1 A few courts have found regulations to be violative
of due process when they fail to take into account regional
needs as opposed to local interests.'
24
A second constitutional challenge is derived from the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 To invoke an
equal protection 'argument, differential treatment of similar
classes of people must be established. The courts utilize two
tests to decide this issue: the traditional "rational basis" test
under which the classification will be upheld if it is reasonably
related to a legitimate state objective;"' and the "compelling
state interest" or "strict scrutiny" test which is invoked where
suspect classifications or fundamental rights are involved."2
Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
"2 This is a heavy burden for the plaintiff to carry, as courts generally favor the
local regulation with the presumption of validity. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954) (ordinance sustained where power of eminent domain invoked for aesthetic
reasons); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (ordinance struck down);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (ordinance sustained
despite trial court's finding of segregation by income).
"I Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1950); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d
395 (Pa. 1970); National Land and Inv. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa.
1965).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See generally Note,
Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645 ((1971).
12 See, e.g., King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971).
'1 To date, suspect classifications include race, creed and color. See, e.g., Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Restrictive Housing Laws, supra note 18, at 647.
Fundamental rights encompass marriage, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); criminal procedure
safeguards, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and travel, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). While some have proposed that the right to housing should be
classified a fundamental constitutional right, the Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971), rejected this suggestion in affirming a state requirement for a local
referendum to approve any federally subsidized housing projects. Invoking the rational
basis standard of review, the Court held the referendum advanced a legitimate state
interest. 402 U.S. at 143. The court subsequently held there was no constitutional
guarantee of a right to housing of "a particular quality", in fact, "[a]bsent constitu-
tional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-
tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972). See Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,
Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. Rxv. 103 (1973); Another Constitu-
tional Standard, supra note 18, at 616-17.
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Under the latter test the burden of proof shifts to the state and
has historically proven extremely difficult to carry.
128
C. Freedom to Travel-A New Challenge to Exclusionary
Zoning
The constitutional right of freedom to travel has a rather
obscure origin, arising not from express language in the Consti-
tution, but rather from a series of cases involving interstate
travel. 129 In three recent cases the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the fundamental right to travel includes the right to
settle within a state. This inclusion springs initially from
Edwards v. California,' in which the Court held that a statute
which imposed a criminal sanction on any person bringing a
non-resident indigent into the state placed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce' and the migration of non-
residents.3 2 In Shapiro v. Thompson,'33 the Court concluded
that a I year residency requirement for eligibility for federally-
sponsored welfare benefits was an unconstitutional limitation
on the right to travel and settle within a state.'34 Further ex-
tending this right in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,135
I Another Constitutional Standard, supra note 18 at 616. Indeed, the Court has
reaffirmed the difficulty of the state's burden of proof in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977). However, citing Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court declared that "official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact ....
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." 97 S.Ct. at 563.
I" Beginning with Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (96 Wall.) 35 (1867), in which the
Court declared invalid a state-imposed tax on all persons leaving the state by common
carrier, the Court has moved from a narrow view of the right to travel to declaring the
right to travel a fundamental right. The most recent cases involve durational residency
requirements which have been held to penalize the exercise of the fundamental right
to travel. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year
residency requirement for indigents to qualify for non-emergency medical care de-
clared invalid); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (requirement of residency bf
1 year in state, 3 months in county for voter eligibility declared invalid); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (1 year residency requirement for welfare benefit eligi-
bility declared invalid). See also Another Constitutional Standard, supra note 18, at
622-24.
1- 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
131 Id. at 177.
12 Id. at 178.
1- 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
l2 Id. at 634, 638.
,25 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona statute which im-
posed a I year residency requirement on indigents for eligibility
for state-funded medical services. Since the statute mandated
residency in the county for 1 year and the Court relied on
Shapiro, it appears that the right to migrate and settle applies
intrastate as well as interstate.1
3
1
One effect of categorizing the right to travel as a funda-
mental constitutional right is illustrated in Dunn v.
Blumstein.'37 A Tennessee statute imposing residency require-
ments of 1 year in the state and 3 months in the county before
one could exercise the right to vote for both federal and state
legislative candidates was held unconstitutional as a denial of
the fundamental rights to travel and to vote. 38 The denial of
the exercise of a fundamental right by state action compelled
the Court to apply the "strict scrutiny" test 3 ' and required the
state to establish a "compelling state interest" to justify the
classification. On the other hand, if the court concludes that
the classification does not deny a fundamental right but merely
penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right, the court should
weigh the penalty in terms of two factors: its potential impact
in deterring the exercise of the right' and its impact on those
who nevertheless exercised their rights in the face of the pen-
alty.14'
Although the two-phase impact determination test pre-
sented in Memorial Hospital' and founded upon Shapiro13 is
available to plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning regula-
tions, it was not until the district court decision in Petaluma'
I's Id. at 264. See also Note, Constitutional Law-Zoning-The Right to Travel
Encompasses the Right to Live in any Municipality, 23 KAN. L. Ray. 324, 327 (1975).
IV 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
13 Id. at 336, 338.
13' See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra for a discussion of the use of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"I Thus in Shapiro the Court concluded: "An indigent who desires to migrate,
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he
must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare
assistance during his first year of residence. . . ." 394 U.S. at 629.
"I Id. at 627.
142 415 U.S. 250, 256-58 (1974).
" 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel in the context of equal protection).
"3 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra
for further discussion of the Petaluma Plan.
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that a zoning case turned on the fundamental right to travel."'
An implicit theme relied on in Petaluma is the right of individ-
uals to migrate without being confronted by community after
community with exclusionary zoning controls.'46 The issue of
timed development presented to the Court of Appeals in New
York in the Ramapo case was not cited by the district court in
Petaluma.'47 While the New York court was openly critical of
exclusionary zoning, deeming it unconstitutional, the court
held the sequential growth plan adopted by the town of Ra-
mapo reflected permissible state objectives despite its restric-
tive character.'
The viability of the right to travel as a significant chal-
lenge to attempts at exclusionary zoning was re-defined by the
California district court. Rather than applying the two-factor,
impact-determination test to evaluate the reasonableness of a
restriction on the right to travel as articulated by the Supreme
Court,' the court took the position that any restraint on the
fundamental right to travel must be justified by showing a
compelling state interest.'50 So, the challenge might be raised
successfully where the local regulations create a level of deter-
rence sufficiently burdensome to impair the freedom to travel
-4 The argument had been made by the plaintiff in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) that his right to travel and settle was violated by a zoning
ordinance which restricted land use to single-family dwellings and defined family as
persons related by blood or marriage or no more than two persons living together who
are not so related. The Court held the ordinance violated no fundamental rights, nor
was it aimed solely at transients.
,' 375 F. Supp. 574, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
,I? The concept of timed development is discussed in the text accompanying notes
75-80 supra.
, Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
The court found the Ramapo plan sought "not to freeze population at present levels
but to maximize growth by the efficient use of land, and in so doing testify to this
community's continuing rule in population assimilation." 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 152.
Interestingly, the court's warm acceptance of Ramapo's goals was apparently
undisturbed by such realities as (a) two-thirds of the vacant land set aside for residen-
tial development is limited to large-lot zoning, (b) no multi-family dwellings are al-
lowed in the town of Ramapo and, (c) with the possible exception of privately spon-
sored housing for the elderly, no public or FHA subsidized housing is scheduled beyond
the 49 units of low-income housing that were in existence before implementation of the
plan. CONTROLLING URBAN GROWTH, supra note 17.
"I Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
' 375 F. Supp. at 581-82.
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among all non-residents, as where neighboring communities all
enact their own restrictive growth schemes. 5'
D. The New General Welfare Standard
Although zoning has traditionally taken a parochial view
of community interests, this need not be so in the future. The
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. recog-
nized that a municipality might not be allowed to stand in the
way of the general public interest.5 ' To date the most notable
expansion of the definition of general welfare has come from
the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Supreme Courts. In several
important cases these courts have considered the needs of the
region rather than simply the desires of the communities in
question.
In 1965 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that
communities must not be allowed to shirk the responsibilities
created by the pressures of suburban migration, in this case
through the vehicle of large-lot zoning. 53 Specifically the court
stated that "[a] zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is
to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities can not be held valid." '54 Relying
upon this case, the same court 5 years later held that a com-
munity could not adopt a large-lot zoning ordinance if its effect
was to impose a disproportionate share of future population
growth on surrounding towns."5 Again the court, in cogent
dicta, stated that "[i]t is not for any given township to say
who may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding
the interests of the entire area."156
Perhaps the most sweeping decision to date which affirms
the notion that the general welfare cannot be defined by focus-
ing on individual communities is Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.57 Not only did the New
"I Zumbrun & Hookano, No-Growth and Related Land-Use Legal Problems, 9
URBAN LAW 122 (1977); Note, supra note 83.
132 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
-"National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (Pa. 1965).
,' Id. at 612.
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970).
'5 Id. at 768.
, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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Jersey court mandate a regional view for classifying general
welfare, but it also revealed a willingness to institute an affirm-
ative action program to restructure the land use policy of a
region. General welfare was defined as extending beyond the
boundaries of individual communities and hence should not
"be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular
municipality. 158 Since every community must accept its fair
share of the region's housing needs, 59 the court concluded that
the appropriate remedy for those plaintiffs who had been ex-
cluded by the zoning ordinance (including potential residents)
was a reform of Mount Laurel's land use regulations with an
eye to the entire region.8 0
HT. PROSPECTS FOR POTENTIAL CHALLENGERS
Few courts may be willing to take the activist stance
adopted by the New Jersey court in Mount Laurel. The deter-
mination of the fair share of a region's housing needs is enough
to keep planning experts busy indefinitely; how often are courts
willing to oversee and evaluate such extended research? ' And
yet the challenge has been proffered: Growth management can-
not be encouraged if it maintains a parochial view which makes
no attempt to correlate resources and population, as well as
economic and environmental goals.
62
Those who would contest controlled growth techniques as
exclusionary should find more success in statutory or constitu-
tional arguments. Assuming one is able to hurdle the question
of standing,' 3 petitioners may argue violation of their civil
rights by the zoning ordinances. '64 The two Supreme Court
'' Id. at 727.
Id. at 732-34. The court stated: "More specifically, presumptively it [the com-
munity] cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low
and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that
opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective regional need therefor." Id. at 734.
IN Id. at 734. For a discussion of various ways to determine a community's fair
share of housing needs, see Rose, Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which Formula
Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs? 12 URi. L. ANN. 3 (1976).
' Rose, supra note 160, at 19.
U" See Zumbrun & Hookano, supra note 151, at 147-49 for a discussion of the the
necessity for a broader perspective on managed growth schemes.
" For a consideration of standing, see text accompanying notes 83-120 supra.
I" See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d through 2000d-
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cases, Euclid and Arlington Heights, have not been encourag-
ing, though the Court has said it is primarily an issue of proof.
Indeed, in Arlington Heights,65 proof of a racially discrimina-
tory purpose would "have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered."'66 The
Court appears willing to apply a sliding scale for the sufficiency
of proof for both motive behind and impact of the challenged
ordinance so that local municipal decisions will rarely be over-
turned."7
Despite the novelty of the constitutional argument of an
exclusionary ordinance violating the fundamental right to
travel, no federal court of appeals has yet been willing to over-
turn a zoning scheme on this basis. 68 It would seem that those
who wish to reform the localized orientations which reign today
would do better by focusing their efforts on legislative changes
rather than relying on the slim chance that they will be the
beneficiaries of judicial activism. In view of the Supreme
Court's strict interpretation of the prudential rules of standing,
potential residents of a community which practices some type
of controlled growth are effectively excluded from litigating
such programs on the merits. As desirable and attractive as
rational planning may be, a balance must be struck, for in-
creasingly, the actions of a few affect many as the interdepend-
ence of individuals, groups and regions becomes inescapable.
C. Davis Hendricks
4 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
"I Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555
(1977).
168 Id. at 566 n.21.
,' Both the Petaluma and Ramapo schemes, discussed in text accompany notes
65-80 supra have withstood court challenges.
I" See text accompanying notes 129-51 supra for a discussion of the freedom to
travel.
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